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I . Introduction 
THE TOPIC OF THIS CONFERENCE AND THE QUESTIONS SUGGESTED BY THE ORGAN-
IZERS ARE IMPORTANT AND, most of all, very well-intentioned. They are 
even, in themselves, a proof of the good intentions we all share. The 
underlying ideas appear to be the sum of the following theories: 1) 
There are universal human rights, 2) These were formulated at an 
historic moment in the French Revolution; 3) Democracy is one of the 
ideas that has «conquered the world» (cfr. Mandelbaum 2002); 4) But 
the world is varied and sometimes resists our good intentions, and not 
everybody acknowledges the rights of man; 5) it is perhaps possible to 
arrive at a compromise, or a dialogue, between the various cultures as 
regards the rights of man; 6) lastly, we need to find effective ways of 
getting them respected in a world that is now global.
These ideas are so well-intentioned that they are very unlikely to 
lend themselves to provocation, but a glimpse at the program of this 
conference appears to show that we will not stop stirring things up 
and that we will manage to turn what should be simple into something 
problematic (cfr. Berlin, 1981: 143). Which is not necessarily a fault, 
because it is almost always important to manage to see where the hitch 
in a question is. Sometimes, before looking for solutions one needs to 
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correctly identify the problem. We can even say that a serious doctor 
normally tries to identify an illness before suggesting treatment – even 
if placebos nevertheless lead to surprising results.
II. The current situation
The problem, as I see it, can be formulated as follows: 1) the language 
of the rights of man is what gets closest today to a consensus in the 
global world and man’s dignity appears to be a common moral and 
political reference point; 2) democracy is the regime with the best 
historical record as regards respecting the rights of man; 3) neverthe-
less we have, perhaps flippantly, stopped believing that democracies 
are government by the people and, in any case, present democracies 
are national, not global; and lastly 4) we have stopped believing 
that man is more than one animal among many. It is difficult not 
to see that there is a certain paradox, if not contradiction in terms, 
between these different opinions, but they are neither more nor less 
disturbing than expressions like “open secret”, “deafening silence” 
or “serious joke”.
We are going to attempt a brief sketch of the question, recalling: 1) 
how democracy has stopped being what it was; 2) which (metaphysical, 
epistemological) prerequisites to the language of rights are required; 
3) the link between citizenship and rights. Perhaps at the end we can 
suggest a potential (and modest) role for the rights of man today. 
I shall try to employ as a guide the words and ideas used bythe 
cold war generation of political philosophers, partly because it had 
a special perspective on the question (some things can only be seen 
clearly in certain historical and social conditions) and partly because 
it managed to maintain an unstable balance on the question that seems 
enviable, in comparison, today.
Pierre Manent recently asserted that “the notion of the rights of 
man is today a common political and moral reference point for the 
West” (Manent, 2001: 163). He even goes as far as to suggest that such a 
homogeneity has not existed since the Great Schism of the West around 
1300 A.D.. The very “right to difference” is based on this unquestion-
able foundation in the shape of the rights of man. 
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Our first difficulty, therefore, is to perceive whether there really 
is a philosophical problem to discuss – as opposed to procedural or 
practical questions – and, if there is, of what nature. If the rights of 
man are unanimously considered fundamental rights that should 
not be violated, the language of those rights gets transformed into a 
powerful banner that can be used as a lever to support every type of 
just human pretension and even – why not? – those of other sentient 
or even inanimate beings (Manent, 2001: 313) . But what are rights? 
What counts as a right? For example: should we consider only the 
right to life and property? How can we decide whether homosexuals 
have a natural right to adopt children or to use wombs for rent? Or if 
there is a right to a just pension or just taxes? Or to see my God and 
my prophet respected?
We can provide two replies: we are able to recognize what the rights 
of man are through the public exchange of opinions and arguments, 
by identifying the solutions and discussing the merits of each one of 
them. It is the point of view of deliberative democracy, which we might 
say gets defined by the assertion “it is public and free deliberation by 
citizens who are equal that is the foundation for political legitimacy” 
(Cohen apud Girard and Le Goff, 2010). This appears today to dominate 
the constitutional theory of democracy (Dryzek, 2000).
The other is a reply that some say is “out-of-date”: it is the aggrega-
tive paradigm of representative democracy (cfr. Girard and Le Goff, 
2010: 20). Deliberative democracy emerged precisely at the end of the 
cold war because today a) there is a refusal of the idea of common good, 
assimilated by its defenders to “general will” (Idem: 26-27); b) there 
is a denial of the figure of an active citizen intervening in politics, a 
denial apparently shared both by the “elitist” conception of democracy 
(Schumpeter, 1976: 329-330) and by the theories of social choice and 
by democratic pluralist models (Dahl, 2000, 2006). The crisis of the 
aggregative paradigm arises when democracy gets defined as a com-
petitive game, the aggregation appears inconsistent (Arrow 1963), and 
what is fundamental in democracy becomes the competition among 
various leaderships and the existence of alternatives. Fortunately “the 
market and the forum” (cfr. Elster 2010) and other ideas arose to replace 
this “failed” theory. The first formulations of this are by the “second 
Rawls” (Rawls, 2005) and the “second Habermas” (Habermas, 2004).
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I do not think I am very wrong if I say that the present approaches 
to the problem of the rights of man, i.e. the approaches subsequent to 
Rawls (Rawls, 1971), take the precedence of right or justice over good 
as a given. And if I say that, in the ideas evolving after Rawls and 
Habermas, right is merely the result of public reason or is procedural, 
in spite of talk about procedural and substantial tendencies (Girard 
and Le Goff: 31), even for the latter substance is nothing more than the 
result of a procedure. They are all formal solutions, where the content 
of proposals for living is subordinated to procedures legitimating it – 
for example, and in the best cases, revealing on the basis of an original 
position (Rawls, 1971) or the equitable result of fair distributions of 
capacities and resources (Sen, 2009), etc.
What we have in common today is that we have stopped believing 
in three things: government by the people, the common good (or if we 
like, aggregative solutions) and justice as a citizen’s duty. How do the 
rights of man fit into our current view of things, when they are an old 
idea which, in their old version, depended on democratic citizenship 
and, in their new one, on the dignity of man – which was still missing 
in 1789? (cfr. Manent, 2001, 319-321) There is no unanimity about the 
foundations. In contemporary discussions there are many different 
competing philosophical justifications of these rights. 
Can the rights of man continue to be a reference point, or are we 
in the presence of one of those cases about which Hegel said that “The 
owls of Minerva fly only by night?”? This is, nevertheless, a problem 
which has less consequences when the various justifications arrive 
at the same conclusion, i.e., that man has fundamental rights that 
cannot be violated (e. g. Nozick, 1974). In this case the problem is only 
practical, i.e., to decide what forms the institutionalization and guar-
anteeing of the rights of man should take on a global level, given that 
the rights of man have never been less the rights of an Englishman. 
The right institutions have to be deduced on the basis of some formal 
revelation procedures. 
In the world, global democracy or justice is, nevertheless, a new 
question, since, even when it was proclaimed to be universal, the tra-
ditional picture of the rights of man was implicitly or explicitly de facto 
that of a national state or of a property-owners democracy. Given that 
both the defense of the rights of man and democracy are positive things, 
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it is to be hoped that they go hand-in-hand and, in fact, it is possible to 
say generally that the historical behavior of democracies as regards the 
rights of man is better, for example, than that of totalitarian regimes 
or many other regimes generally, like kleptomaniac dictatorships, and 
we can provide statistics that confirm this assertion (cfr. Przeworski, 
2000, Epstein, 2006).
The situation may seem, as we said, paradoxical: it is possible to 
say that, if the rights of man were the manifesto of the earliest modern 
democracies, we should like to maintain and defend them in spite 
of already not believing either that man has natural rights and that 
democracy is government by the people. We do not even believe that 
man is more than a biped without feathers (cfr. Statesman).
But who, without particular malice, can be against sending a boat 
to pick up victims of the Vietnam War – an idea capable of uniting 
Jean-Paul Sartre and Raymond Aron around the same table? Who 
is not against torture in Guantanamo and the closing of that military 
prison? Or, generally, against the right to life, property and the search 
for happiness? – expressions that, even if much used, have still not 
lost their power (Strauss, 1992: 1-2). For sure, people with an icono-
clastic personality, like Raymond Aron, did not fail to point out that 
what counted as a right in the context of the American Declaration of 
Independence and the French Revolution was not exactly the same as 
what counts as a right in the declaration of 1948 or other more recent 
ones (Aron, 1972). If, earlier on, the rights of man were mainly the 
rights a citizen had to defend himself against the state or against who 
was governing, later on these became rights that citizens could claim 
from the state and that the state has the duty to respect. And, among 
others, Aron, maliciously, also pointed out that the right to holidays 
with pay and to a peaceful and just world order or a decent standard of 
living perhaps did not possess the same universality and practicabil-
ity as the earlier Déclaration des droits de l’Homme et du cityoen– which 
was also not free of paradoxes, because it asserted the obviousness of 
being born free and equal.
And, moreover, the list of the rights of man has now become much 
longer, thanks to social rights, and would be much longer still, if it 
included everything involving the last utopia resisting the end of 
history and the crisis of the markets – that of the global village – or, 
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after the crisis of the markets, that of global Social-Democracy (Judt, 
2010) since we are not ready to do without either the welfare state or 
supermarkets with a variety of products and a greener world.
III. The cold war liberals: a special insight
In interviews he had, towards the end of his life, even Isaiah Berlin, 
who had a strained relationship with many men of the Enlightenment, 
whom he considered enemies of freedom, and who suspected that there 
was no consistent and harmonious solution for human society, asserted 
that the Declaration of the Rights of Man was certainly the French 
Revolution’s greatest civilizational acquisition, that it was practically 
equivalent to the minimum requirements of a decent society and that 
democracy was preferable to other regimes because it was based on 
the rights of man (Berlin and Jahanbegloo, 1992: 74, 114) .
We could remodel the question as follows: the problem is that either 
rights cannot be more than traditions and each society and each man 
has the right not only to follow their own path but also to define that 
there are paths (Aron, 1978) and that there is no Archimedean point on 
which to rely for judging other societies from the present or the past. 
Or, on the contrary, there is perhaps a standard by which we can judge 
social life. In other words, either there is no duty towards society and 
even talking about this makes us look like we belong to a long lost era 
or, on the contrary, there is no democracy without virtue and, even if 
democracy is the institution with the most varied lives in their colors 
and forms (Rep. Bk. VIII), the city can ask us for the supreme sacrifice 
– without mentioning other, lesser sacrifices like being part of a jury 
or expressing oneself frankly in a public assembly.
To express it another way, there are two mutually exclusive alterna-
tives: either rights, or what is just, are natural, i.e., there is something 
objectively constituting people’s rights or justice in a political system 
and individual people – and political systems may, or may not, be up to 
these universal standards. Or rights and justice are purely conventional 
and there are no universal or objective standards and rights and justice 
is entirely composed of the beliefs or practices of individual communi-
ties. Under these conditions democracy would be just in Athens and 
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unjust in Persia. Saying that every right is conventional is like saying 
that there is no external position from which to criticize the standards 
of any particular community.
We can start to see that the contours of the question are hard to 
make out if we consider how, on the rare occasions in which he dis-
pensed with the immunity of a commentator and spoke with his own 
voice, Isaiah Berlin made it clear that he did not believe that there was 
a human nature that was constant (Berlin, 1997: 20-21, 29-30), even if 
perhaps there were some minimum requirements for what can still be 
considered human (Idem: 203-4). That is, man is a being that has rights, 
although the list of these rights today appears to be not only elastic but 
capable of being extended indefinitely and there are many incompat-
ible and competing justifications for man’s particular dignity, both by 
Christians believing in the human soul and by theists, or by materialists 
of various types who think there is no “ghost in the machine” and that 
man is nothing more than a set of electrically charged synapses. The 
problem about accepting many different justifications, however, is that 
one inevitably has the suspicion that, perhaps, none of them is true.
This suspicion could only be avoided while one believed in a justice 
above conventions to which one could appeal, but nowadays this belief 
has become dissipated, if it has not completely disappeared. It was this 
that Leo Strauss feared would happen in America, as he had already 
seen in his native Germany, so that the wise words of the Declaration 
of Independence, in the form taken up a century later by Abraham 
Lincoln, would be considered merely new identities and ideologies, 
or even “myths”, formulated at the time of a Revolution promising a 
new social and political order. 
Why do we need to maintain, or worse still, impose these identi-
ties, ideologies and myths on other cultures? Perhaps torture here, 
slavery there, or the immolation of widows on pyres are, in the end, 
part of the right to be different. Strauss felt that the rights of man could 
only be upheld if there was a natural right not depending on human 
arbitrariness (Strauss, 2012: 1). 
Strauss was not unaware that it was possible to consider the 
rights of man as ideals to aspire to, but he stressed that “we do not 
understand the duties to be ideals” (Strauss, 2012: 2) and, in the end, 
considered the solution to be unsatisfactory, given that the Nazis 
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had just as much faith in their ideals as democrats in theirs. But, if 
he considered this problem the “most serious of problems” (Idem: 1), 
he also acknowledged that social utility should not be confused with 
truth. It might very well happen that the language used for rights by 
the Founding Fathers is nothing but a pious lie that it would perhaps 
be better not to unveil to non-philosophers, at the risk of weakening 
the social fabric, interwoven with common beliefs.
But Raymond Aron, curiously the only of these post-war phi-
losophers to assert clearly the existence of human nature, asserted: 
“in the strict sense of the term, I do not partake of the philosophy of 
the rights of man” (Aron, 1978: 228-29). The philosophy of the rights 
of man gets its inspiration from religious beliefs, or a philosophy of 
natural law. The roots to this view of the world are perhaps, as Comte 
considered, fundamentally religious. For Christianity each soul has 
its own particular destiny, a belief however that has never stopped 
religion from adapting to every kind of social organization (Ibidem). 
Another tradition is that of the modern philosophy of natural rights, 
which discovers or reconstructs a “state of nature”, a stage earlier than, 
or external to, society (Idem: 229).
Berlin as well, considering these theories “metaphysical politics”, 
stated: 
“closely related to and historically connected with this view [i. e. of natural 
law] is the doctrine that I possess certain rights, implanted in me by nature, 
or granted to me by God or by the sovereign, and that these cannot be 
exercised unless there is an appropriate code of laws enjoining obedience 
by some persons to others” (Berlin, 2006: 20, cfr. also: 45-46).
Although he acknowledges that “sometimes the existence of this 
ultimate metaphysical system is forgotten and natural rights are con-
ceived as isolated entities or attributes or relations, ‘somehow’ inher-
ent in moral agents in an altogether unique and inexplicable fashion: 
as imprescriptible or eternal ‘rights of man’ (…) though it is not made 
clear by what logic or cognitive process such conclusions are reached” 
(Idem, 164-165).
It is not therefore an exaggeration to assert that these political 
philosophers, the so-called liberals of the Cold War, like Raymond 
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Aron, Leo Strauss and Isaiah Berlin, were generally skeptical about 
the language of human rights.
IV. Reasons for the skepticism and skepticism about the capacity 
of reason
They all wrote long texts in which they traced the language of modern 
human rights back to the Philosophes of the 17th and 18th centuries, 
who won the argument at the time of the American Declaration of 
Independence and the French Revolution (cfr. Idem: 156). When Aron, 
or Berlin, or Strauss did not lend themselves to observing its metamor-
phosis in the manifestos of the day, they pointed out the romantic and 
irrationalistic reactions that destroyed this philosophy of the rights of 
man and faith in human progress. This did not stop them, evidently, 
from supporting concrete causes involving the rights of man. We can 
ascribe this skeptical attitude to a number of different reasons. 
Some reasons are historical, like the disappointment with the 
efforts of the Société des Nations, which proved incapable of preventing 
wars and atrocities on an unheard of scale; or the contrast between 
the practices and, at the same time, the declarations of intent of the 
signatories of many Communist or African countries. It is historical 
reasons like this that help us to understand, for example, Strauss’s 
words about the pitiful and powerless rights of man (Cfr. Strauss, 2002) 
or the sadness with which Raymond Aron recalled that declarations 
of rights meant little if they were not accompanied by political citizen-
ship rights” (Aron, 1977: 1262). In fact, only a catastrophe was capable 
of bringing together countries with opposing principles in the same 
declaration – as Berlin recalled: only the tragedy of an unimaginable 
war resuscitated, in the post-war period, a rhetoric weakened by 
nationalisms. 
Nevertheless there were perhaps other, more important reasons, 
of a theoretical nature, for these thinkers’ skepticism: they all shared 
a limited trust in the capacity of reason to encapsulate timeless values 
in a formula. None of them based his theories on any contractualistic 
formula, and no deliberation about public reason could replace prin-
ciples, but the principles were difficult, if not impossible, to formulate. 
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In late interviews Berlin said frankly: I do not believe that it is possible 
to make a list of the rights of man (Berlin and Polanowska: 86). 
It was the discovery of politics in the tumult of history that awak-
ened them. For this reason they all insisted on the link between demo-
cratic citizenship and the rights of man (Aron, 1974). The rights of 
man were linked to the duties of a citizen. The rights required the 
mediation of the city. The city or nation to which they owed loyalty 
was characterized by each one of them in very different ways. The 
stress given to the city’s institutions was different: Isaiah Berlin spoke 
of pluralism, Leo Strauss of loyalty to constitutionalism and Raymond 
Aron of defense of pluralist constitutional regimes, but they were not 
confused by outside appearances ( the fact that the bride wore a veil 
did not stop them recognizing her), because this difference in their 
characterization did not prevent all of them from being “friends but 
not adulators of democracy”, even after being warned by Schumpeter 
that a democratic majority was capable of condemning witches (or, if 
you like, Jews in concentration camps) to being burnt. 
Were these political philosophers wrong to never separate democ-
racy and polis or nation? To trust more in common democratic man or 
in a few statesmen, whose verve and greatness they admired, than in 
enlightened intellectuals, judges of a Supreme Court or institutional 
solutions? They all considered personal and institutional solutions 
to be fragile, and reckoned that the true battle was that about “ideas”, 
in philosophy and in sociology, considering that the Highest Court 
on earth is more likely to call on the social sciences than on biblical 
commandments. 
V. Conclusion: pious lies and the role of the rights of man today
Can this skepticism teach us anything? Teach, for example, that there 
are pious lies that are socially useful and the best thing is to cover them 
up with the chaste veil of silence? Or that the rights of man are an “open 
secret” or a “serious joke”, with a placebo effect, but no more than 
that? Not entirely. Even if imperfect, these political “manifestos”, even 
if historically located, implicitly acknowledge, ashamedly, that there 
is something timeless in man and in ethics. This “truth” about man 
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needs to be asserted in a positive way and transformed into institutions, 
even if any transformation is always problematical. At a first glimpse 
it even appears that a country endorses more and more human rights 
declarations if it is prone to human right violations. 
How can human rights be defended on a global level? Current 
solutions include not only the international Declarations of Rights, 
Conventions, laws and even international criminal courts. If we follow 
these thinkers, any solution is only effective, if it is effective, when it 
is not disconnected from political rights – not least because the most 
serious cases always arise in each city with its metics. And in spite 
of the enormous difficulties in encapsulating “what man is” in a for-
mula or a list, these manifestos would gain something if they did not 
include rights that are obviously only transitory and parochial, at the 
risk of losing part of their strength and relapsing more quickly into 
the ridiculousness of an ancient bibelot. Universality is a condition for 
the strength of this lever. 
If we wanted to generalize, we could say that the institutionalization 
of this “practical truth” about man should only be entrusted to fully 
inclusive democratic mechanisms, in which both nationals and foreign-
ers have full rights, at the risk of becoming empty rhetoric as regards 
those that most need to be protected. Which is not an authorization 
to transform everything, foreign policy or fiscal policy, into questions 
of rights. I would, however, add that a translation into the language 
of the rights of man cannot be a way of silencing political debate or 
transforming social and political programs into questions of principle, 
“that are not to be discussed”. 
Just before finishing let me also suggest that, in the end, it is per-
haps not possible to indefinitely ignore the question of the primacy of 
good which is the standard used by justice, or the question of men’s 
(natural) rights debated in a substantive and not formal way.
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